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Selected Developments in California Law
California Coastal Commission v.
Granite Rock: The Battle of Big Sur
Over twenty million acres of National Forest Land exists within
the boundaries of California.' Historically, pursuant to Article IV of
the U.S. Constitution 2 Congress exercised primarily a proprietary
right over the National Forest System, subject to limitation by state
law.' With the ruling in Kleppe v. New Mexico,4 the Supreme Court
decided that Congress may exercise both a proprietary and legislative
right over the public domain.5 Following the decision of the Court
1. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstracts of the U.S., Table 1172 (1987).
2. U.S. CONST. ART. IV, § 3, cl. 2. Congress has the power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States. Id.
3. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARiz. L.Rav. 283, 329
(1976). With the exception of the creation of private rights in federal lands, the protection of
public lands, and the application of the necessary and proper clause or the inter-governmental
immunities doctrine, the federal power under Article IV Property Clause was subordinate to
state legislation. Id. But see Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 269, 306 (1980) (advocating the use of the public trust doctrine in public
land law development). Wilkinson indicates that Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 539 (1976),
is consistent with earlier cases, citing Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) and Camfield
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897), similar to the development of federal law under the
Commerce Clause, and cited with approval by the Court in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
436 U.S. 371, 393 (1978); Percival, State and Local Control of Energy Development on Federal
Lands, 32 STAN. L. REv. 373, 375 (1980) (examining the extent to which state and local
governments can control energy development on federal lands and escape preemption by
limiting regulations to environmental controls).
4. 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of the Wild Free-Roaming Horses
and Burros Act under the Property Clause to prohibit the removal of wild burros from federal
land).
5. Kleppe, at 543. See Percival, supra note 3, at 382.
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in Kleppe, a split of authority developed in the courts surrounding
state regulation of mining by private parties on federal land. 6 In
California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, 7 the California
Coastal Commission, pursuant to section 30600(a) of the California
Coastal Act, required Granite Rock to obtain a coastal development
permit to continue mining within the San Padres National Forest.,
Granite Rock argued that application of section 30600(a) violated
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 9 The Supreme Court
held that states may regulate mining by private parties in the National
Forest System provided state regulations are imposed for environ-
mental purposes.'0 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that Granite
Rock must apply for a permit from the California Coastal Commis-
sion in order to continue mining within the San Padres National
Forest. "
Part I of this Note discusses the legal background of the applicable
federal and state regulations and prior judicial decisions regarding
state permit requirements. Part II will summarize the facts of the
Granite Rock case and review the decision of the U.S. Supreme
Court. Part III will discuss the possible legal ramifications of Granite
Rock.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Supremacy Clause and the Doctrine of Preemption
Article IV, section three of the United States Constitution vests in
Congress the power to enforce and enact rules necessary to regulate
property belonging to the public domain. 2 Laws enacted by Congress
regulating the public lands may preempt state regulation of private
6. See infra notes 72-99 and accompanying text.
7. 107 S.Ct. 1419 (1987).
8. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1423; CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 30600(a) (1987).
9. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1423; U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2 (mandating that the
Constitution, Laws of the United States, and all Tresties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, are the Supreme Law of the Land).
10. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1429.
11. Id. at 1431-32.
12. U.S. CoNSr. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540-41 (noting
the power of Congress over public lands is complete and unlimited, but states retain jurisdiction
over federal lands, enforcing criminal and civil laws on those lands); cf. Engdahl, supra note
3.
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activity within the public domain in three ways.' 3 First, Congress
may preempt state law by expressly stating the intention to occupy
the entire field, thus displacing state regulations completely. 4 Second,
the intent of Congress to preempt state law may be inferred from a
comprehensive scheme of federal regulation or a dominant federal
interest.' 5 Third, in areas where Congressional intent to occupy the
entire field is not expressed, federal law preempts state law to the
extent the two conflict. 16 State law conflicts with federal law when
compliance with both federal and state regulations is impossible or
the state law stands as an obstacleto the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 7 Federal
mining, forest, and coastal regulations governing federal land do not
expressly forbid California from regulating private mining operations
within the Los Padres National Forest. 8 Therefore, California may
13. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; See generally G. Finnell, Jr., Intergovernmental Relation-
ships in Coastal Land Management, 25 NAT. RES. J. 31, 39-49 (1985) (discussing tension
among federal, state, and local governments over coastal zone management); Comment,
Challenges to the Constitutionality of the California Divestment Statute, 19 PAC. L. J. 217,
222-29 (1987) (advocating California Assembly Bill 134 is preempted by the federal Anti-
Apartheid Act); Herman, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and
the Burger Court, 9 INDUS. REL. L. J. 623, 625, 633 (1987) (discussing the impact of the
favorable decisions of the Burger Court to concurrent state-federal regulation on the preemption
doctrine).
14. California Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. 683, 689 (1987) (holding
Title VII does not preempt the California Fair Employment and Housing Act section 12945(b)(2)
which requires employers to provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by preg-
nancy); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 510, 525 (1977) (holding section 408 of the
Federal Meat Inspection Act expressly preempted California statute regulating meat packaging
and marking requirements).
15. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. at 689; Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(establishing pervasive regulation, dominant federal interest and unhampered operation as
factors for determining the intent of Congress to preempt state regulation). See Herman, supra
note 13.
16. Guerra, 107 S.Ct.at 689; Hillsborough County v. Automotive Medical Labs., 471
U.S. 707, 721 (1985) (upholding county ordinance despite comprehensive federal regulations
in the field of blood collection and distribution); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 15 (1824)
(holding state law invalid if it interferes with, or is contrary to, federal law).
17. Guerra, 107 S.Ct. at 689; Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 721; Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (California statute that applied
a different maturity test for avocadoes from federal regulations not preempted by federal
regulations since both statutes could be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence
of the field); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (state statute, which required aliens
to register and carry identification cards, preempted since statute stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in providing
for uniform naturalization and immigration laws). See Finnell, supra note 13, at 39. The
Finnell article suggests that Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. will resolve most coastal
land management preemption questions. State legislation affecting land use, because it occurs
in a field traditionally subject to state and local control, should be subjected to a presumption
against federal preemption. Federal legislation should only preempt state legislation if the two
conflict. Id.
18. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1426, 1430-31.
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regulate private mining operations unless the federal regulatory scheme
implicitly preempts such regulation or California and federal regu-
lations directly conflict.
B. Federal Statutory Law
1. Mining Regulations
To encourage the development of mineral resources in the public
domain, Congress enacted the Mining Act of 1872.19 The Mining Act
grants citizens the right to explore federal lands for mineral deposits. 20
Under the Mining Act, once an individual locates a deposit and
complies with state recording laws, the mining claimant obtains the
exclusive right to possess the land.2' The mining claimant may receive
title to land from the federal government by patenting the claim. 22
An unpatented mining claim, however, remains a fully recognized
possessory interest.
23
In 1955, Congress passed the Surface Resource Act 24 to prevent
abuses, under the Mining Act of 1872, by claimants who locate
mining claims on public lands for purposes other than legitimate
mining activity. 2 Prior to the issuance of a patent, the unpatented
19. 30 U.S.C.A § 21 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
20. H.R. REP. No. 5891, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1955) U.S. CODE CONo. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2474, 2476. See generally, United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (interpreting
section 314 of the Federal Land and Policy Management Act as requiring mandatory compliance
with recording regulations); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335-37 (1963)
(upholding right of United States to institute administrative proceedings to determine the
validity of mining claims); United States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277, 1281
(9th Cir. 1980) (public access upon unpatented mining claim upheld, absent evidence of material
interference with mining claim); United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1979)
(right of Secretary of Agriculture to regulate mining within the National Forest System under
the Surface Resource act of 1955 upheld); Brubaker v. Board of County Commissioners, 652
P.2d 1050, 1056 (Colo. 1982); Andrus v. Click, 554 P.2d 969, 973 (Idaho 1976).
21. 30 U.S.C.A §§ 26, 611 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). See H.R. REP. No. 5891, supra
note 20, at 2476. A location is made by staking the corners of the claim, posting a notice of
location, and complying with the state laws regarding the recording of the location in the
county recorder's office. Id. See also Curtis-Nevada Mines, 611 F.2d at 1281 (recognizing that
a valid discovery requires a showing that the mineral can be extracted, removed and marketed
at a profit and the exclusive possession and use of the mining claim is incident to prospecting
and mining).
22. 30 U.S.C.A § 29 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
23. Locke, 471 U.S. at 70-71.
24. 30 U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
25. H.R. REP. No. 5891, supra note 20, at 2474-79.
250
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claim can only be used for prospecting, mining, or processing op-
erations and reasonably related activities. 26 Additionally, Congress
retains the right to manage and dispose of the surface resources. 27
To consolidate and modernize public land laws, Congress enacted
the Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).28 The
FLPMA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to establish compre-
hensive rules and regulations with respect to the management, use,
and protection of public lands. 29 FLPMA affects state and local
pollution control regulations and land use requirements by mandating
incorporation of non-federal pollution control laws and consideration
of land use planning and management programs of State and local
governments when the Secretary of the Interior develops and revises
federal land use plans.30 Therefore, while the Mining Act of 1872
and the Surface Resource Act of 1955 do not express an intent to
preempt state regulations governing private activity on federal land,
FLPMA requires mandatory compliance with state and local pollution
standards but allows discretionary compliance with state and local
land use plans.
3'
26. 30 U.S.C.A. § 612(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
27. Id. § 612(b). The United States retains the right to manage and dispose of the surface
resources prior to issuance of a patent. Id. See Id. § 601. The Surface Resource Act divides
the jurisdiction of the public lands between the Secretary of Interior and Secretary of
Agriculture, giving the latter jurisdiction over the surface resources of public lands within the
National Forest System. Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(c) (1987) (excludes the National
Forest System from regulations issued by the Bureau of Land Management over surface
resources located within the public domain); 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 (1987) (Forest Service regulations
protect surface resources within the National Forest System from adverse environmental impact
from mining). Haggard, Regulation of Mining Law Activities on Federal Lands, 21 ROCKY
MTN. L. INsT. 349, 363 (discusses general regulations governing mining exploration under the
Mining Law of 1872); Freyfogle, Federal Lands and Local Communities, 27 ARiz. L. REv.
653, 656 (1985) (examines the role of federal, state, and local governments in land use planning
advocating federal interests yielding to state and local interests unless the state and local
interests conflict with fundamental federal purposes). Although Congress delegated to the
Secretary of Agriculture the authority to manage and dispose of the surface resources within
the National Forest System, the Secretary of the Interior, through the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), retains the authority to manage the mineral resources found in the
National Forest. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1427. With regard to hard rock minerals, BLM
determines whether the land is subject to location under the mining laws and whether the
mining claimant properly located and recorded the mine, performed the assessment work, and
complied with the patent requirement. Id. at 1434 (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-84 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
29. H.R. REP. No. 1277, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWs 6175, 6176. See Percival, supra note 3, at 382. See also 63A AM. JUR. 2D Public
Lands §§ 13, 42 (Supp. 1987).
30. 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1712 (c)(8), 1712 (c)(9) (West Supp. 1987). See Percival, supra note
3, at 382.
31. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 6228, 6229. See Percival, supra note 3, at 382.
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2. Forest Regulations
In 1974, the United States Forest Service passed regulations gov-
erning unpatented mining claims in the National Forest System.3 2
During the same year, Congress adopted the Forest and Rangeland
Renewable Resources Planning Act (RPA).33 Congress amended the
RPA with the passage of the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA) in 1976.
34
The Forest Service regulations were enacted to protect the surface
resources of the National Forest System from adverse environmental
impact caused by prospecting and mining on unpatented mining
claims." The Forest Service regulations require compliance with
federal and state environmental standards, including air, water, and
waste disposal standards. 36 The regulations provide a plan approval
mechanism, bonding requirements, and procedures for environmental
impact appraisal. 37 Section 228.4 of the Forest Service regulations
requires any person proposing to conduct operations which might
cause disturbance of surface resources to file a notice of intention
to operate with the appropriate district ranger. 33 A plan of operations
must be submitted to the district ranger, if the district ranger deter-
mines that the proposed operations would cause significant distur-
bance of surface resources. 39 In addition, in reviewing the plan of
operations, section 228.5 of the Forest Service regulations requires
the district ranger to balance the economics of the planned operation
with the environmental impact on surface resources to determine the
reasonableness of the operation plan.40
32. 36 C.F.R. § 228.1-.80 (1987).
33. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1600-87 (West 1979) (originally enacted as Act of Aug. 17, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 1, 88 Stat. 476 (1974)).
34. Id. §§ 1604-14 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
35. 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 (1987).
36. 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (1987).
37. S. Dempsey, Forest Service Regulations concerning the Effect of Mining Operations
on Surface Resources, 8 NAT. RES. LAW. 481 (1975) (discussing the background and ramifi-
cations of the Forest Service regulations).
38. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (1987). See also id. §§ 228.3 (a), 228.3(c), 228.3(d) (regulating
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity engaging in all
functions, work, and activities in connection with prospecting, exploration, development, mining
or processing or mineral resources and all uses reasonably incident thereto, on any unpatented
mining claim in the National Forest System).
39. Id. § 228.4(a).
40. Id. §§ 228.4(c)(3), 228.4(f), 228.5(a), 228.8. The Forest Service makes land use
252
1988 / California Coastal Commission
In 1976, Congress amended the RPA by adopting the National
Forest Management Act.41 NFMA directs the Forest Service to adopt
regulations regarding the development and revision of land manage-
ment plans for the protection, use, and development of the renewable
resources in the National Forest System.4 2 To accomplish the purposes
of the NFMA, the Forest Service must develop an individual land
and resource management plan for each administrative unit of the
National Forest System. 43 Furthermore, the Forest Service must es-
tablish an advisory board for formulation of the standards and
guidelines for the Forest Service programs."4 Finally, the Forest
Service must give federal, state, local governments and the public




The Forest Service regulations require a mining claimant working
within the National Forest System to comply with both Federal and
State environmental standards, including air, water, and waste dis-
posal standards.4 6 Although the NFMA directs the Forest Service to
coordinate the forest plans with the planning processes of other state
and local governments, the NFMA does not mandate compliance
with state or local land use plans. 47 Ultimately, the Forest Service
determines the resource protection standards necessary to comply
with NFMA through implementation of the forest plans.
48
determinations through its review of a mining plan of operations. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at
1433-34 (Powell, J.,dissenting). See also Freyfogle, supra note 27, at 675. BLM and the Forest
Service translate the mulitple policy goals into specific decisions deciding the best blend of
resource uses and carry out that decision by dedicating the parcel to the designated uses. Id.
41. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1604-14 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). See generally W. O'Riordan, S.
Horngren, The Minimum Management Requirements of Forest Planning, 17 ENVTL. L. 643
(1987) (criticizing the utilization of minimum management requirements in the forest planning
process as a systematic refusal by the Forest Service to comply with the requirements of the
National Forest Management Act); D. Teeguarden, Benefit-Cost Analysis in National Forest
System Planning: Policy, Uses, and Limitations, 17 ENVTL. L. 393 (1987) (examining benefit-
cost analysis as a method to guide Forest Service decision making); Comment, The National
Forest Management Act of 1976: A Critical Look at Two Trees in the NFMA Forest, 22
I-AND & WATER L. REv. 413 (1987) (discussing the effects of the National Forest Management
Act upon local communities and Wyoming legislation).
42. See S. REP. No. 94-893, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6662.
43. 36 C.F.R. § 219.27 (1987). See Comment, supra note 41, at 416. The individual
management plan controls all management decisions for the forest and specifies the minimum
resource protection standards necessary to comply with the NFMA. Id. See also O'Riordan &
Horngren, supra note 41, at 646.
44. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1612(b) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
45. Id. § 1612(a).
46. 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (1987).
47. Id. § 219.6.
48. Id. § 219.27.
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3. Federal Coastal Zone Regulations
Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
(CZMA)49 to encourage and assist coastal states in implementing
management programs for the coastal zone of the United States.5 0
Under the CZMA, the Secretary of Commerce may make grants to
any coastal state to assist the state in the development, completion,
and initial implementation of a management program for the land
and water resources of its coastal zone.5' Once a state coastal plan
has been approved, 52 section 307(c)(3)(A) of the CZMA requires
federally permitted private activity, including mining operations, to
be consistent with approved state coastal programs. 3
Under the CZMA, federally permitted activities occurring in the
coastal zone or affecting land and water uses in the coastal zone
49. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-64 (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
50. Id. § 1452(1). S. REP. 92-753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4776. A coastal state borders on the Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic Ocean,
the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or more of the Great Lakes. 16 U.S.C.A.
1454(4) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). The coastal zone includes coastal waters, adjacent shore-
lands, islands, transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches. Id. §
1453(i). The zone extends inland from the shorelines only to the extent necessary to control
shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal water.
Excluded from the coatal zone are lands the use of which is by law subject solely to the
discretion of or which is held in trust by the Federal Government. The Department of
Commerce has interpreted section 1453(1) to exclude all federally-owned land from the CZMA
definition of state coastal zones. Id. See Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1429; 15 C.F.R. § 923.33
(1987).
51. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1454(a), (c)-(g), 1454(i) (West. 1979 & Supp. 1987).
52. To qualify for a federal grant, the state management program must define the
permissible land and water uses within the coastal zone which have a direct and significant
impact on the coastal waters and identify the means by which the state proposes to exert
control over the land and water uses. Id. §§ 1454(b)(2), (4) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). The
state coastal program must designate a single agency to receive and administer the grants for
implementing the management program with the authority necessary to administer and regulate,
directly or indirectly, land and water use regulations, control development in order to ensure
compliance with the management program, and to resolve conflicts among competing uses.
Id. §§ 1455(c)(5)-(6), (d)(1), (e)(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). See Comment, 28 U. MlMI L.
REv. 135, 188 (1973) (advocating a combination of federal, state, and local controls to obtain
effective land management of federal land). In developing and adopting the management
program, the state must provide for full participation by relevant federal and state agencies,
local governments, regional organizations, and other interested public and private parties;
coordinate the coastal management program with local, areawide, and interstate plans applicable
to the area within the coastal zone; and establish an effective mechanism for continuing
consultation and coordination to assure the full participation of local governments and agencies.
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1455(c), (c)(2)(A)-(B), (c)(8), (d)(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987). Additionally,
the state plan must adequately consider the national interest and the views of federal agencies
principally affected by the coastal program. Id. § 1456(b).
53. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
1988 / California Coastal Commission
must be fully consistent with state coastal programs.5 4 Therefore, the
federal permit application must include verification that the proposed
activity complies with, and will be conducted in a manner consistent
with, the state coastal program.5 5 The federal agency may not issue
the permit until the state coastal agency concurs with the applicant's
certification or until, by the failure of the state to act, the concurrence
is conclusively presumed.1
6
The CZMA indicates that Congress did not intend to diminish
state authority through federal preemption.57 Rather, Congress in-
tended to enhance state authority by encouraging and assisting state
planning and regulatory power over coastal zones.5 8 Therefore, fed-
erally permitted activities occurring within the coastal zone or which
affect land and water uses in the coastal zone must be fully consistent
with state coastal programs. 9
C. California Coastal Act
California passed the Coastal Act of 197660 as a comprehensive
scheme to govern land use planning for the entire coastal zone of
California. 6' The goals specified under the California Coastal Act
include protecting and enhancing the coastal zone environment, bal-
ancing the use and conservation of coastal zone resources, maximizing
public access to the coastal zone, assuring priority for coastal-
dependent and coastal-related development, and encouraging state
54. 15 C.F.R. § 930.32(a) (1987). See T. Eichenberg, Federal Consistency Doctrine, 14
ECOLOGY L. Q. 9, 25-30 (1987) (discussing the federal consistency doctrine and recent challenges
to the authority of the coastal states).
55. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
56. Id. If the state rejects the certification, the Secretary of Commerce may still grant
the permit after finding that the activity is consistent with the objectives of the CZMA or is
otherwise necessary in the interest of national security. Id.
57. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1430-31; S. REP. No. 92-753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4776.
58. S. REP. 92-753, supra note 57, at 4776. See Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1430-31.
59. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987).
60. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30000-30900 (West Supp. 1988).
61. See American Petroleum Inst. v. Knecht, 609 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979). In
November 1972, voters approved the California Conservation Act, which established the
California Coastal Commission and six regional commissions to prepare a comprehensive plan
for the long-range development and conservation of the coastal zone resources of the state.
In 1975, the commission submitted its plan to the legislature and governor for approval. In
1976, the California legislature enacted the California Coastal Act which is similar to the
Commission's proposed plan. Id. See also Review of Selected 1976 California Legislation, 8
PAC. L.J. 351, 353-354 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Legislation] (discussing and analyzing the
California Coastal Act).
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and local initiatives and cooperation. 62 The California Coastal Com-
mission assumes primary responsiblity for implementing the Califor-
nia Coastal Act provisions and exercises any and all powers set forth
in the CZMA.
63
Under the California Coastal Act, all local governments within the
coastal zone must prepare and submit to the California Coastal
Commission a local coastal plan,. which includes the land use plans
and zoning ordinances of the local government. 64 A local coastal
program must promote public access to the sea and shorelines,
recreational uses, protection of the marine environment and land
resources, and coastal and industrial development .6  Additionally,
any development in the coastal zone requires a coastal development
permit.66
Prior to the certification of local coastal programs, permits may
be obtained from the local government if the local government has
chosen to implement a permit process and has prepared procedures
that are in accord with the guidelines issued by the California Coastal
Commission. 67 If the local government does not implement a permit
process, a coastal development permit must be obtained from the
California Coastal Commission. 6 Once the local coastal programs
are approved and all implementing actions are effective, permits must
be obtained from the local government implementing the local coastal
program. 69 Except for an appeal to the California Coastal Commis-
62. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 30001.5(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1988).
63. Id. § 30300-30355. See 1976 Legislation, supra note 61, at 356-57.
64. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30500(a) (West Supp. 1988). See Yost v. Thomas, 36 Cal. 3d
561, 566, 685 P.2d 1152, 1154-55, 205 Cal.Rptr. 801, 804 (1984) (deciding that the California
Coastal Act does not preempt local planning authority or the power of the voters to act
through referendum). A local coastal program is the land use plans, zoning ordinances, zoning
district maps, and/or the implementing actions of the local government, which meet the
requirements of the Coastal Act. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30108.6 (West Supp. 1988). Land
use plans of the local government indicate the kinds, locations, and intensity of land uses, the
applicable resource protection and development policies and a listing of implementing actions.
Id. § 30108.5.
65. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30210-13, 30220-24, 30230-36, 30241-44, 30250-55, 30260-64
(West Supp. 1988).
66. Id. § 30600(a). Development includes grading, removing, dredging, mining, or extrac-
tion of any materials. Id. § 30106. The coastal zone of California encompasses the land and
water area from the Oregon border to the border of the Republic of Mexico, extending
seaward to the outer limit of jurisdiction of California and extending inland generally 1,000
yards from the mean high tide line of the sea. Id. § 30103(a). In significant coastal estuarine,
habitat, and recreational areas, the coastal zone extends inland to the first major ridgeline
paralleling the sea or five miles from the mean high tide line of the sea. Id.
67. Id. § 30600(b).
68. Id. § 30600(c).
69. Id. § 30600(d).
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sion from the denial of a coastal development permit, the California
Coastal Commission duties are limited to conducting five-year re-
views, certifying local coastal program amendments, and making
original permitting decisions for a small class of extra-sensitive coastal
lands.-
D. Case Law
Beginning with the 1976 Idaho Supreme Court decision of State
ex rel. Andrus v. Click,7' state and federal courts disagreed about
permissible state regulation of private mining on federal land.7 2 The
Idaho, Colorado, and Wyoming Supreme Courts permitted state and
local governments to regulate, but not prohibit, private mining on
federal lands.7 1 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found
that a county permit system interfered with the purposes and objec-
tives of Congress, concluding that Forest Service regulations pre-
emepted local environmental regulations.
7 4
In Andrus v. Click, the Idaho Supreme Court ordered Click, a
miner, to obtain the requisite state permit to continue mining oper-
ations on unpatented federal land in the St. Joe National Forest .7
Under the Idaho Dredge and Placer Mining Protection Act, 76 the
70. Id. §§ 30519(b), 30519.5, 30514, 30601, 30603. See F. Slimp 11, The Sovereign
Commission: of Coastal Permits, Continuing Jurisdiction, and Vanishing Local Independence,
SW. U.L. REV. 699, 702 (1986) (criticizing the Coastal Commission for trying to prolong its
emstence through monitoring post-certification activities).
71. State ex. rel. Andrus v. Click, 554 P.2d 969 (Idaho 1976).
72. Compare Andrus, 554 P.2d 969 (permitting state to require a permit from miners
operating within the St. Joe National Forest on grounds that states could regulate but not
prohibit federally permitted private activity), and Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652
P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982) (invalidating county permit on grounds county denied permit to
drill in the Pike National Forest but indicating a permit system is permissible provided federally
permitted activities were not prohibited) and Gulf Oil v. Wyoming Oil & Gas, 693 P.2d 227
(Wyo. 1985) (upholding state permit of federally permitted activity on ground that Congress
did not intend to occupy the entire field of environmental regulations and state regulation
implemented the national policy of environmental protection) with Ventura County v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 947 (1980) (invalidating county
permit requirement of federally permitted activity ruling that the local ordinances directly
conflicted with federal law by allowing the county to temporarily or permanently prohibit the
use of federal lands).
73. See Gulf Oil, 693 P.2d at 227; Brubaker, 652 P.2d at 1050; Andrus, 554 P.2d at 969;
Ventura, 601 F.2d at 1080. See generaly Freyfogle, supra note 27, at 658-71.
74. Freyfogle, supra note 27, at 658-71.
75. Andrus, 554 P.2d at 972.
76. The Idaho Dredge and Placer Mining Protection Act was enacted in 1955. See Andrus,
554 P.2d at 973. The Act requires operators of dredge or placer mines on lands and beds of
streams in the State of Idaho to obtain a permit by paying a set fee and obtaining a surety
bond. Id.
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permit could be denied, if the State Board of Land Commissioners
determined that the mining operation was not in the public interest. 7
Applying a preemption analysis, the court ruled that the state permit
did not directly conflict with federal law. 78 Although the state reserved
the right to deny the permit and prevent mining on federal land, the
court concluded that as long as mining on Federal land is not
prohibited, the state could impose higher environmental standards."
Furthermore, the court concluded that the Idaho act did not interfere
with the purposes and objectives of the mining laws. 0 The court
determined that Congress intended to promote mining but minimize
the adverse environmental impacts of mining.8 ' The court concluded
that the Idaho act upheld the intent of Congress by fostering envi-
ronmental protection, while not prohibiting all mining activities.12
In Brubaker v. Board of County Commissioners,83 the Colorado
Supreme Court invalidated a county zoning ordinance which allowed
El Paso County to deny a permit to drill in the Pike National
Forest.8 4 The permit applicant received the necessary federal approval
for the proposed drilling operation. 85 However, the county denied
the permit because the operations were inconsistent with the long-
range plans adopted by the county and incompatible with existing
and permitted uses on surrounding properties.8 6 In rejecting the
zoning ordinance, the court distinguished between regulation and
prohibition of federally permitted private activity on federal land. 87
The court recognized that the county could supplement the mining
laws by imposing reasonable conditions upon the use of federal
lands, particularly when dictated by environmental concerns, but the
county could not prohibit activities contemplated and authorized by
federal law.
88
77. See id. The Idaho Dredge and Placer Mining Act is administered by the Idaho State
Board of Land Commissioners. The powers of the Board included the right to deny an
application for a permit on any unpatented mining claims if the dredge mining operation
would not be in the public interest, giving consideration to economic factors, recreational use
for such lands, fish and wildlife habitat and other factors which in the judgment of the Board
may be pertinent. Id.
78. Id. at 975. The applicable federal law includes the Mining Act of 1897, the Mining
and Minerals Policy Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act. Id.
79. Id. at 975-76.
80. Id. at 976-77.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Brubaker v. Board of County Comm'rs, 652 P.2d 1050 (Colo. 1982).
84. Id. at 1053.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1056-60.
88. Id. at 1059.
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Contrary to the decisions of Andrus and Brubaker, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp.,19
invalidated a permit requirement under county zoning ordinances as
preempted by federal lawY9 Similar to Andrus, the county could
refuse to issue the permit if the drilling operations were not in the
public interest.9' Gulf Oil leased from the Department of Interior
120 acres of land located within the Los Padres National Forest for
purposes of oil exploration and development.9 2 Gulf received permits
from the United States Department of Interior and the Forest Ser-
vice.93 After drilling operations commenced, Ventura notified Gulf
that the county zoning ordinance prohibited oil exploration and
extraction unless a permit was obtained from the county planning
commission.9 4 Gulf refused to comply.95
Affirming the dismissal of the complaint filed by Ventura County,
the court of appeals found a direct conflict between the local ordi-
nance and federal laws.9 6 The court concluded that the local ordi-
nances stood as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress by allowing the county
to temporarily or permanently prohibit the federally authorized use
of federal lands.9 Contrary to the Idaho Supreme Court in Andrus,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ventura County could
not regulate the drilling to protect the environment; environmental
hazards incident to drilling were protected by the extensive regulations
of the Department of Agriculture and the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969. 98
As demonstrated by the Andrus, Brubaker, and Ventura decisions, a
split developed in the courts as to permissible state regulation of
federally permitted mining on federal land. Andrus and Brubaker
upheld state and local permits which did not prohibit but only
regulated federally permitted mining. Ventura found local environ-
mental regulations preempted by the Forest Service regulations. 99
89. Ventura County v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1979).






96. Id. at 1086. The applicable federal law includes the Mining Act of 1897, the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of 1920, the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, and the Forest
Service regulations. Id. at 1083-84.
97. Id. at 1086.
98. Id.
99. See, supra notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
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II. THE CASE
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, the United
States Supreme Court rejected a Supremacy Clause challenge con-
cerning the constitutionality of a coastal development permit required
by the California Coastal Commission under section 30600(a) of the
California Coastal Act. 100 The Court limited the discussion to the
issue of whether any state permii issued by the California Coastal
Commission on unpatented mining claims in the National Forest
System would be permissible.' 0' The Court held that states may
regulate federally permitted mining by private parties in the National
Forest System provided state regulations are imposed for environ-
mental purposes. 0 2 The Court implied, however, that a state coastal
permit imposing land use regulations on unpatented mining claims
would be preempted by the FLPMA and the NFMA. 103
A. Facts
Granite Rock ran a commercial mining operation on unpatented
land in the Los Padres National Forest, located within the coastal
zone as established by the CZMA and California Coastal Act.' °4
From 1959 to 1980, Granite Rock removed relatively small samples
of limestone for mineral analysis. In 1981, Granite Rock obtained
the requisite approval by the Forest Service and began removing
substantial amounts of limestone for resale to private purchasers. On
October 17, 1983, the District Director of the California Coastal
Commission informed Granite Rock that a permit was required to
continue the mining operations and the five year plan of operations
submitted to the Forest Service was subject to consistency review by
the Commission. In October of 1983, Granite Rock filed suit in the
United States District Court to enjoin the California Coastal Com-
100. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1426.
101. Id. at 1431.
102. Id. at 1429.
103. Id. at 1427-29.
104. Granite Rock v. California Coastal Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 (1984). Granite
Rock was engaged in commercial mining of a valuable five to seven-acre quarry of high
calcium whiting grade limestone, estimated value $15,000. Id. The mining activity in Big Sur
included blasting and opening a quarry, constructing and improving roads, building a bridge,
boring test holes and conducting core drilling, improving a water storage system, and dumping
rock waste in a disposal area. Id.
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mission from requiring a coastal development permit and consistency
review of the five year plan of operations.0 5 The District Court
denied the motion for summary judgment made by Granite Rock
and dismissed the complaint. 0 6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed.0 7
B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court. 0 8 The
Supreme Court held that the permit required by the California
Coastal Commission is facially permissible, provided the state only
imposes reasonable environmental regulations on mining within the
National Forest System. 09 First, the Court explored whether the
Federal environmental regulations of unpatented mining claims in
the National Forest System demonstrates an intent to preempt state
regulation."10 Second, the Court examined the intent of Congress to
limit the state to a purely advisory role in federal land management
decisions."' Finally, the Court considered whether the CZMA ex-
cludes federal land from state coastal zone management."12
1. Federal Environmental Regulations
The Court observed that the Mining Act of 1872 and the Forest
Service regulations do not express an intent to preempt state law."
3
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1375. The district court concluded that the Coastal Commission sought not to
prohibit or veto, but to regulate the mining activity in accordance with the detailed requirements
of the Coastal Act which provides for permit issuance upon compliance with regulatory
requirements comparable to those of the Forest Service. Id. If the permit issued by the Coastal
Commission prevented Granite Rock from exercising federally authorized activities, then the
court would enjoin the enforcement of the permit. Id.
107. Granite Rock v. California Coastal Comm'n, 768 F.2d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 1985). In
reversing the lower court, the appellate court recognized that the Forest Service regulations
recognize that a state could enact environmental regulations in addition to those established
by federal agencies. However, the appellate court believed that an independent state permit
system to enforce state environmental standards would undermine the permit system of the
Forest Service. The court concluded that to allow a second tier of permit authority to be
exercised by the state would undermine the ability of the Forest Service to keep the applicable
environmental requirements within the range of reasonableness. Id.
108. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1424.
109. Id. at 1426-27.
110. Id. at 1425-27.
111. Id. at 1425, 1427-29.
112. Id. at 1425, 1429-31.
113. Id. at 1426.
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The Court held that the Mining Act and the Forest Service regulations
require compliance with state law." 4 The Court observed that the
Forest Service regulations require Granite Rock to comply with
California air, water, and waste disposal standards, noting that under
Forest Service regulations compliance with state environmental reg-
ulations fulfills similar or parallel Forest Service requirements." '
Additionally, the Forest Service environmental assessment of the plan
of operations submitted by Granite Rock states that Granite Rock
was to obtain any necessary permits which may be required by the
California Coastal Commission." 6 Therefore, the Court held that the
Forest Service regulations do not indicate a federal intent to preempt
state environmental regulations of unpatented mining claims in the
National Forest System. "7
2. Role of the States in Federal Land Management
The Court noted that Granite Rock chose to seek injunctive and
declaratory relief prior to applying for the coastal development
permit."" Therefore, the Court limited its constitutional analysis to
whether any possible set of conditions attached to the coastal devel-
opment permit would be preempted." 9 The Court assumed for the
discussion of the case, that the NFMA and the FLPMA preempt
state land use plans of unpatented mining claims in the National
Forest System. °20 The Court distinguished land use from environ-
mental regulations, 2' remarking that while the California Coastal
Act gives the California Coastal Commission land use and environ-
114. Id. at 1426-27. See 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.5(b), 228.8(a)-(c), (h) (1987).
115. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1426-27.
116. Id. at 1427.
117. Id. at 1426-27.
118. Id. at 1429.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1427.
121. Id. at 1428-29. The Court distinguished land use regulations from environmental
regulations by defining the former as choosing particular uses for the land while the latter
does not mandate particular uses of the land but requires only that, however the land is used,
damage to the environment is kept within prescribed limits. The Court relied on 43 U.S.C.A.
§ 1712(c)(9) and 36 C.F.R. § 228.1 as congressional indication of the distinction between land
use planning and environmental reguations. Additionally, the Court relies on the split of
authority between the Department of the Interior to regulate the management of minerals in
the National Forest System and the Department of Agriculture to regulate surface resources.
Id.
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mental regulatory authority, section 30004 of the California Coastal
Act' 22 also gives the Commission the ability to limit the requirements
placed on the permit. 123 Consistent with the view of the Court that
the Forest Service regulations do not preempt all state environmental
regulations, the Court stated that the California Coastal Commission
may issue permits imposing reasonable environmental regulations.' 24
3. Federal Land within State Coastal Zone
Finally, the Court acknowledged that the Department of Commerce
interpreted section 1453(a) of the CZMA to exclude all federally
owned land from the CZMA definition of the coastal zone of a
state.125 However, the Court indicated that even if federal land was
excluded from the coastal zone of the state, the CZMA does not
automatically preempt all state regulation of mining on federal land. 26
The Court held that Congress clearly indicated that the CZMA would
not be an independent cause of preemption except in cases of actual
conflict.' 2 7 The Court indicated that the barren record of the facial
challenge did not demonstrate a conflict between the permit require-
ment of the California Coastal Commission and federal law. 128 How-
ever, the Court concluded that any future application of the California
Coastal Commission permit which did conflict with federal law would
not be approved. 29
C. Dissenting Opinions
Dissenting, Justice Powell and Justice Stevens wrote that the Court
focused on selected provisions of the federal statutes, to the exclusion
of other relevant provisions and the larger regulatory context by
examining the Forest Service regulations apart from the statutes that
122. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30004 (West Supp. 1988).
123. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1428. In relying on Public Resources Code section 30004,
the Court held that since the California Coastal Act does not detail exactly what standards
will and will not apply to federal activity, the Coastal Act must be understood to allow the
California Coastal Commission to limit the regulations it will impose on federally authorized
mining activity. Id.
124. Id. at 1429.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1430-31.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1432.
129. Id.
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authorized the regulations. 130 The dissent observed that the Forest
Service regulations explicitly require federal permit applicants to
comply with state air, water, and solid waste standards which are
preserved by specific nonpreemption clauses in other federal sta-
tutes. 3' The dissent concluded that the specific preservation by the
Forest Service of state air, water, and solid waste standards hardly
suggests an implicit intent to allow the state to apply other environ-
mental regulations to private mining on federal land.
32
Justices Powell and Stevens noted that the federal permit system
reflects a careful balance between two important federal interests:
the development of mineral resources on federal land and the pro-
tection of the national forests from environmental harm. 3' The
dissent concluded that by allowing states to issue a permit before
mining operations could proceed gives the state the power to strike
a different balance between mineral development and environmental
protection and forbid federally approved activity.
34
Justice Scalia and Justice White also dissented.' In their opinion,
the California Coastal Act is a land use statute and the permit is a
land use control device preempted by the FLPMA and the NFMA.
3 6
Justices Scalia and White based their conclusion on the CZMA
criteria for federal approval of state coastal programs and the state-
approved local coastal programs which consist of land use plans and
implementing devices. 7 The Justices concluded that the coastal per-
mit constitutes a regulation of the use of federal land and is thus
preempted by the NFMA and the FLPMA. 38
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Granite Rock allows the California Coastal Commission, acting
under the authority granted to the Commission by the California
130. Id. at 1434.
131. Id. at 1434-35. The dissent cited the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the
Solid Waste Disposal Act. Id. See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1323(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (the Clean
Water Act), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6961, 7418(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1987) (the Solid Waste Disposal
Act and the Clean Air Act).
132. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1435.
133. Id. at 1437-38.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1438.
136. Id. at 1439. See Comment, supra note 52, at 153-165 (describing the types of land
use statutes which include zoning ordinances, open space zoning, subdivision controls, and
permits).
137. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1439-42.
138. Id. at 1441.
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Coastal Act and the CZMA, to impose reasonable environmental
regulations upon federally authorized private activity, such as min-
ing. 39 The Court employed new criteria by distinguishing land use
from environmental regulations rather than following the Andrus
and Brubaker decisions distinguishing regulation from prohibition.1 40
In addition, the Court implicitly overruled the decision in Ventura. 4'
The Court indicated that federally permitted private activity which
falls within the National Forest System must apply for a coastal
development permit. 4 Therefore, following the Granite Rock deci-
sion, leasing operations which fall within the coastal zone of the
state must obtain a coastal development permit which may impose
additional environmental regulations. 14
The California Coastal Commission possesses the potential to
prohibit federally permitted private activity. 1'" Section 307(c)(3)(A)
of the CZMA requires federally permitted activity to be fully con-
sistent with approved state coastal programs. 41 If the activity does
not meet the additional environmental regulations imposed by the
Commission, the Commission may deny approval and the federal
agency may not issue a federal permit. 46 As Justices Powell and
139. Id. at 1429.
140. Compare Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1425-29 (the Court distinguished between land
use and environmental regulations indicating that the NFMA and the FLPMA preempt state
land use plans of unpatented mining claims in the National Forest System) with Andrus, 554
P.2d at 975-76 (permitting state to require a permit from miners within the National Forest
System on grounds that state could regulate but not prohibit federally permitted private
activity) and Brubaker, 652 P.2d at 1059 (permitting a permit system provided federally
permitted activities were not prohibited).
141. Compare Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1425-29 (holding that states may regulate federally
permitted mining by private parties in the National Forest System provided state regulations
are imposed for environmental purposes) with Ventura County, 601 F.2d at 1086 (holding that
environmental hazards incident to drilling were protected by the extensive regulations of the
Department of Agriculture and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969). See also,
Leshy, Granite Rock and The States' Influence Over Federal Land Use, RESOURCE LAW NOTES,
February 1988, at 6 (analyzing the unanswered questions left by the Granite Rock decision)
(on file at P.L.J.).
142. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1431-32.
143. Pua. LANDS NEWS, April 2, 1987, at 1. Under the California Coastal Act, development
includes extraction of any materials. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 30106 (West Supp. 1988). See
also Leshy, supra note 141, at 9 (indicating that the Granite Rock decision has implications
outside the framework of the Mining Law because the decision is grounded on the distinction
between environmental and land use regulations).
144. See Eidenberg, supra note 54, at 28 (comparing federal activities which only need to
be consistent to the maximum extent practicable with the state coastal program to federally
permitted activity which needs to be fully consistent with the state coastal program).
145. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (c)(3)(A) (West 1979 & Supp.
1987).
See Leshy, supra note 141, at 6.
146. Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456 (c)(3)(A) (West 1979 & Supp.
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Stevens indicated in their dissent, the Commission has the power to
strike a different balance between mineral development and environ-
mental protection and possesses the potential to forbid activity other-
wise approved by the Forest Service.
47
However, the majority hinted that both the FLPMA and the
NFMA preempt state land use regulations.1 48 States can not issue a
permit which seeks to mandate particular uses of the federal land .
49
The California Coastal Commission must issue an environmental
permit which does not impose land use restrictions. 50 Therefore, the
Commission may require additional environmental safeguards but
may not control the use of federal land by denying a permit or state
land use plans.' 5' In addition, if the Commission imposes environ-
mental regulations which actually conflict with the federal objective
to encourage mining upon federal land, federal mining and forest
regulations would preempt the state coastal regulation.
5 2
The majority stated that although the California Coastal Commis-
sion has the authority to issue regulations governing land use and
environmental protection, section 30004 of the California Coastal
Act allows the California Coastal Commission to limit the require-
ments it will place on the permit.'53 Therefore, the California Coastal
Commisison may impose environmental regulations even though the
California Coastal Act also gives the California Coastal Commission
land use regulatory authority. 5 4 However, under section 30519.5,
once the local coastal plan is approved and all implementing actions
have become effective, all permits must be issued by the local
government. 5 The California Coastal Commission may only hear
appeals from local permit decisions. 56 The Court indicated that the
1987). See Leshy, supra note 141, at 6.
147. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1437-38. See Leshy, supra note 141, at 6.
148. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1427-29.
149. PUB. LANDS NEWS, April 16, 1987, at 5. See also Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1427-
29.
150. PUB. LANDS NEWS, April 16, 1987, at 5.
151. Id.
152. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1452. See Leshy, supra note 141, at 7. In discussing how
far a state could go in denying or imposing conditions on permits, Leshy suggested a two step
analysis: first, how far the state can go in regulating before it is preempted by federal law
and second, how far the state can go in regulating before it unconstitutionally takes whatever
property right the miner possesses. Id.
153. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1428.
154. Id. at 1428-29.
155. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 30519.5, 30600(d) (West Supp. 1988).
156. Id. § 30519.5.
266
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permit in question did not involve a local coastal program which is
based on land use plans and zoning ordinances. 5 7 Therefore, local
governments may be prevented from imposing environmental regu-
lations upon federal activities which fall within their coastal zone if
section 30004 of the California Coastal Act does not allow the local
governments to limit the requirements the local governments will
place on the permit.
58
CONCLUSION
In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the facial challenge by Granite Rock
to the permit required by the California Coastal Commission to mine
on National Forest land. Although the Forest Service regulations
require compliance with state air, water, and waste disposal stan-
dards, the California Coastal Commision may supplement the federal
regulations with additional environmental requirements. Under the
Granite Rock decision, the state possesses the power to prohibit
federally approved acitivty on federal land by private individuals.
However, the Court hinted that the state could not impose land use
restrictions nor could the state permit directly conflict with federal
mining, forest, and coastal regulations.
Laura J. Baird
157. Granite Rock, 107 S.Ct. at 1427-29.
158. The Court distinguished between a permit issued directly by the California Coastal
Commission under section 30600(c) and a permit issued by the local government under sections
30600(b) or 30600(d) of the California Coastal Act which includes land use plans and zoning
ordinances. Id. See Leshy, supra note 141, at 8. Leshy indicates that the Forest Service, the
Bureau of Land Management and Congress would be more willing to allow state regulation
on federal lands than to tolerate regulation by every county, village, or special government
district. Id.

